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THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL, GENEVA FOR BWC DEL

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#) [OPCW](#) [CBW](#) [GM](#)

SUBJECT: CWC BWC CLOSE ALLIES MEETING SEPTEMBER 28-29, 2009

REF: STATE 100317

11. (SBU) Summary: Meetings of Close Allies have always been valued for providing a useful venue for a frank exchange of views on, and an opportunity to coordinate approaches to, biological and chemical weapons-related issues. This meeting showed the need to re-invigorate the process, from the perspective of lighting a fire under some of our counterparts, to employing different approaches to work key issues, such as the planned in advance break-out sessions on CWC incapacitants, and the scheduled session on BWC CBMs. Close Allies could also be used to coordinate on related issues, e.g. BTEX and Global Partnership. Exchanges on biological weapons demonstrated a shared satisfaction in the August Meeting of Experts, common objectives for the December Meeting of States Parties, and common concerns about the NAM and Iranian Article X proposals (that would mandate assistance and impact detrimentally on export controls), and how to handle them. Approaches to BWC CBMs were reviewed and additional discussions on the margins of the December meeting were agreed. The UK also advocated initiating Review Conference planning soon. U.S. recalled BWC policy decisions to date, made clear opposition to the Iranian and NAM proposals regarding Article X, and on establishing a suggested core group for RevCon preparations. On CWC issues, the critical decision on the future Director-General was hamstrung by two members having candidates, both of whom believe they have strong support. Allies shared views on Iraq, CW destruction, the draft 2010 budget, industry issues, national implementation, and the future of OPCW with little new information and few new ideas. Close Allies tentatively agreed to April 7-8 for the next meeting, to be hosted by the U.S. in Washington, D.C. End Summary.

BWC Meeting of Experts (August 2009)

12. (SBU) Close Allies agreed that the August 24-28 BWC Experts Group Meeting exceeded expectations; the linkage between health and security issues had been undisputed. The presentations from all quarters were insightful, the number of delegates sent from capitals with disease surveillance expertise and the vibrant interaction throughout the week where direct assistance was being worked out more than offset Iranian and Cuban (NAM) rhetoric about the need for greater assistance under Art. X and the need for greater technology transfer. There is a great deal of substance coming from the meeting that the December Meeting of States Parties can draw from for its Final Report, which is traditionally a set of agreed guidelines based on expert discussions and a compilation of the ideas expressed that the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) distributed at the end of the Experts Meeting.

13. (SBU) All shared concerns about the NAM and Iranian proposals regarding Article X (free-flow of S&T transfers) and export controls, and how to counter them at the December

Meeting (reftel). Dels noted that the Iranians weren't able to garner NAM consensus for their paper, which states that every article of the BWC & bears the same value and importance.<sup>8</sup> U.S. HOD noted the Iranians had attacked cooperation between States Parties (U.S.) and non-State Parties (Israel) as a way the non-States Parties & may strengthen their clandestine biological programs.<sup>8</sup> The Chinese supported the purpose of both papers; there was no other direct support. German Expert Beck noted the Iranian complaint about lack of access for researchers and surmised the & deemed export control<sup>8</sup> efforts are having their effect. ¶4. (SBU) Dels agreed there was a general recognition by the NAM of the need to strengthen national health infrastructure.

Algeria, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan publically asked for assistance. Unexpectedly, there was little resistance to the direct linkage to implementation of the WHO's International Health Regulations (IHRs). The WHO IHR Workshop on August 21 and the distributed report was credited with delivering the necessary background for all BWC dels to be aware of the intent and timelines for the IHRs. There was recognition that coordination amongst even the group needs to be better (e.g., uncoordinated US-Georgia and UK-Georgia presentations).

#### BWC Policy Roll-out/Interest in Review Conference Preparations

¶5. (SBU) UK Rep suggested that Close Allies initiate as early as December a discussion on preparations for the Review Conference, recognizing that political maneuvering would start as early as this year's Meeting of States Parties. He also noted that that this year's topic didn't address BWC compliance, an issue raised by others in UK bilats on the margins of the MXP. In addition, some dels opined that intersessional issues to date will not provide sufficient substance for 2011.

¶6. (SBU) U.S. Rep recalled U.S. policy decisions to date (shared with Close Allies on margins of August Expert's meeting), including a decision not to return to Protocol negotiations. Drawing on guidance reftel, he elaborated U.S. concerns with the NAM and Iranian proposals related to Article X. In response to UK's suggestion that Close Allies begin to focus on preparations for the Review Conference, U.S. Rep also signaled U.S. interest in working with a & core group.<sup>8</sup> It was agreed that this question, among others, could be discussed at a German hosted close Allies meeting in December on the margins of the Meeting of States Parties.

#### December Meeting of States Parties

¶7. (SBU) Drawing in guidance reftel, U.S. Rep summarized objectives for the December Meeting. Allies agreed on desirable outcomes from the meeting, and Germany added & sustainability<sup>8</sup> as a theme. Those States receiving assistance need to be able to sustain the work initiated. All also shared concerns about the handling of the NAM proposals on Article X and Iran's proposals on Export Control and Transfer Denials at the December meeting. Germany recalled that the proposals were outside the 2009 mandate; the agenda item was narrowly circumscribed to discuss capacity-building in the context of disease surveillance. Nonetheless, China, the NAM, and Iran all signaled an interest in export control discussions at the December meeting. France suggested focusing, as at the Expert's Meeting, on concrete proposals and the actual volume of assistance being offered globally. UK suggested that the points about export control will require rebuttal at an appropriate time, and all agreed BWC Chairman Grinius should be sensitized to problems with the proposals, as outside the mandated agenda item, and on substantive grounds.

Germany offered to prepare a working paper identifying all countries with legislation regarding export controls, as a number of developing nations have now implemented such legislation. UK also suggested working with developing nations that are now recipients of assistance, to counter the more radical proposals.

#### BWC Confidence-Building Measures

¶8. (U) CBMs. German Expert summarized the Geneva Forum August workshop on CBMs, and circulated a matrix capturing the views of Close Allies on several CBM questions he had posed some months ago, requesting U.S. views. U.S. Deloffs recalled the U.S. interest in enhancing participation in the CBM declarations, noting that it was reviewing ideas related to making the process of such submissions more user friendly.

Explaining that the U.S. was working on how to make its own submissions electronic, U.S. offered to work with others on such a project, which was welcomed. The U.S. hoped to be able to provide more detailed views on CBMs for the matrix in the near future. However, the U.S. suggested that before going too far down the road, it would be useful to know what views of non-Western delegations were on the CBMs. France and UK elaborated upon their respective papers. Regarding the UK suggested new proposals,<sup>8</sup> they explained that they were brainstorming ideas, rather than advocacy proposals, and acknowledged that new proposals raise questions of political feasibility. German Expert cautioned against being overly ambitious, favoring a modest approach focused on making submissions easier and clarifying existing CBMs.

¶9. (SBU) CBM Next Steps: The four agreed to exchange views on the margins of the December BWC Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, prior to the second Geneva Forum hosted workshop on December 12. The U.S. offered a CBMs break-out<sup>8</sup> session during the Spring Close Allies meeting it will host; others agreed. Germany will host a third CBM Workshop in Berlin in late spring/early summer 2010.

#### Implementation Support Unit

¶10. (SBU) ISU. France expressed interest in using the ISU to assist even more with CBMs, perhaps to issue reminders, and seek clarification regarding CBMs from States Parties. The UK noted that it had circulated a paper addressing an expanded ISU role. Germany said that while interested in addressing the ISU role, it should not be linked with CBMs, but rather with overall BWC objectives. On the margins, French Rep asked U.S. Deloff for U.S. views on the ISU, and its possible expansion. U.S. Deloff noted that the U.S. had yet to address this question, but that the ISU's roll was, and should be, directly related to its functions and any decisions the Parties take at the 2011 Review Conference that might require the assistance of an expanded ISU. The U.S. sought a reinvigorated BWC program, which might call for a small and careful ISU expansion. For now, we were pleased with the work of the ISU, and with the fact that it works within its circumscribed mandate.

#### Universality

¶11. (SBU) Dels exchanged information on where national and ISU efforts stand. Despite the fact that all non-States parties deemed to be capable of joining the BWC have been divided up between the four, responses to demarches have had little effect. The real movement is coming from the ISU efforts on the ground, particularly in the South Pacific where the Cook Islands accession has motivated the Marshall Islands, Nauru and Niue to push the accession process. U.S. del relayed the ISU view that the universality push will likely bring 5-6 new States Parties on board in the next six months. The U.S. made contacts with the Tanzanian and Haitian delegates in August and will follow-through with a demarche to all countries listed here to provide the necessary political push to help keep their efforts moving forward.

#### Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX)

¶12. (SBU) Dels agreed on the value of maintaining an active BTEX process, although Russian push-back and ineffective G-8 Presidencies in the last two years had let the process stagnate. A policy discussion on the future of BTEX is necessary; both the U.S. and UK offered to host such a meeting on the margins of the December BWC meetings. Canada will become G-8 President in 2010 and may wish to take the leading role in rejuvenating the process. They are undertaking a large push for more resources behind the Global

Partnership; this includes on bio. All agreed that expanding the membership in the group was not helpful, although the group could certainly do more outreach once the purpose and goals of this group are more clearly defined. No one expected bio issues to rise any higher on the agenda of the Nonproliferation Director,s Group (NPDG) given the plethora of pressing nuclear issues. (There was no discussion of moving the group away from the G-8 NPDG process and into Lyon-Roma, which had been the preferred venue for the Allies in the past few years.) UK MOD rep (Harrison) pointed to the overlap between the BWC, BTEX and Global Partnership where many of the same subjects are being discussed; there should be an effort to have them work in sync.

¶13. (SBU) Responding to the U.S. suggestion that more needs to be undertaken in the prevention side. Beck opined that protecting the food chain, law enforcement and more emphasis on how intelligence is used to forecast an event would certainly be considered in support of national security. Mikulak asked that all consider the prevention aspects in prep for a December discussion with the wider group.

#### Synthetic Biology

¶14. (U) U.S. Rep (Mikulak) briefed the group in general terms on the draft U.S. screening procedures for gene synthesis orders. He noted the complementarity of customer screening and sequence screening, as well as the importance of a government point of contact for companies to call if they have identified an order of concern. German expert (Beck) said that German regulations provided a strong foundation, but that designating a law enforcement point of contact was problematic in the German federal system. All expressed interest in receiving copies of the draft procedures when they are published in the Federal Register in late 2009.

#### EU Joint Actions

¶15. (SBU) When queried on details of the BWC and WHO EU Joint Actions (JA), Beck chuckled and said the BWC JA was a political and organizational mistake.<sup>8</sup> The process of hiring the two people to implement the BWC JA had consisted of the European Commission and UN personnel officials going back-and-forth on who would advertise the positions. The compromise is that the applications process had been open to all and EU persons would be chosen. Anyone starting fresh will need start-up time to learn the intricacies of the CBM process and national implementation measures before attempting to promulgate these measures. There will be five workshops on national implementation and universality in the remaining months of the JA. U.S. asked which countries had applied for the eight &scholarships<sup>8</sup> having heard from the Jordanians, Kenyans and Nigerians that they intended to apply. Dels were awaiting the upcoming &CODUN<sup>8</sup> for the answer from the EC WMD coordinator,s office. U.S. reiterated its concern over &buying off<sup>8</sup> staff to help the mandated three-person ISU; what is to keep the Iranian,s from doing the same. The WHO JA will consist of 20 months of regional workshops on biosafety and biosecurity with particular focus on South East Asia. Again, specific details will be forthcoming from the CODUN meeting. EU member states have been kept out of the loop on EC-WHO and EC-ISU negotiations.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

##### DESTRUCTION

¶16. (SBU) The Quad discussion on CW destruction focused on how to manage the 2012 deadline and ensure a balanced approach, the Brazilian proposal for the EC Chairman to have consultations and report to the February Executive Council session, and the likelihood of Russia meeting the destruction deadline.

¶17. (SBU) Managing 2012: Burkhart stated that any special Conference of States Parties on destruction will require advanced planning. The UK agreed and added that in late 2010 State Parties will need to address the issue, in some regard, in order to determine the budget for 2011. Harrison added that it is time to have a discussion on 2012. To date the EU

position has been to urge possessor states to destroy CW as quickly as possible, but he assessed that this position will only last so long. At some point credibility of the Convention comes into question. It is clear that Russian and the United States have made great efforts to accelerate, but at some point a discussion needs to occur on how to address ¶2012.

¶18. (SBU) Brazilian proposal: US HOD noted the recent Brazilian proposal for the Chairman have consultations on the feasibility of meeting the destruction deadline. He said the Brazilian approach seemed a constructive way to hold discussions; this approach could help prevent a damaging venting on the issue if discussion was suppressed. He went on to say that there have been past discussions by some State Parties to amend the treaty or make a technical change, neither of which are suitable options. Burkhart agreed that the Brazilian proposal may be a good mechanism to prompt a discussion early rather than later. France added that Brazil probably will raise his proposal at the October EC session and that there may be discussion of a facilitator.

¶19. (SBU) Russia: Germany expressed doubt on Russia meeting its 45 percent deadline on time, adding that it may be a close call. US HOD said that he thinks Russia will make the 45 percent deadline in December 2009, but then the real question will be when they acknowledge that they will not meet their 100 percent deadline. The UK stated that Russia has consistently had a high level of confidence that they would meet the 45 percent destruction deadline. He added that in the Destruction Informals, State Parties only hear the Russian side of the program and its national position. The UK proposed having Donor countries provide short presentations during the Destruction Informals before the EC session to present a balanced view of what assistance Russia is receiving at its various facilities. Germany agreed, but cautioned that Russia may use it as a platform to criticize foreign aid. The United States fully supported the UK proposal and added that Russia would blame donors with or without the presentations. The UK suggested that donors consult in The Hague prior to the Destruction informals.

IRAQ: Bilateral with Germany

¶20. (SBU) Before the Quad meeting started, the US Delegation met with Dr. Andreas Pfaffernoschke (Germany) to exchange information on U.S. and German CWC-related assistance to Iraq. After the July Executive Council, GOI approached Germany on possible assistance pertaining to the Muthanna Bunkers, particularly on determining the contents and the condition of the bunkers. GOI sees the bunkers as a priority in moving forward. Germany expressed concern about Bunker 13 due to its unknown state of its contents, possible rocket fuel, and unexploded ordinances. As such, the German proposal to Iraq will consist of equipment and training for an air quality sampling and air composition assessment. From there, Germany believes that a proposal could be put together for robotics to do an interior survey of the bunkers. The German Rep indicated a number of issues with any German assistance and future Iraqi efforts: the need to determine appropriate security (which should be a precondition of any work); a determination on whether or not work will be done E

under the supervision of the OPCW; and additional information on the bunkers, to include where drilling may be possible to gain air samples and what known conditions exist inside the bunkers that could prevent robotics from conducting mapping. Although Germany is willing to develop a plan for an intrusive survey and provide training to carry it out, Germany does not intend to offer assistance to conduct the actual assessment. Pfaffernoschke will meet Iraqi expert al-Saraa in Amman on October 6 to discuss these issues.

¶21. (SBU) The United States overviewed the upcoming meetings in Washington with GOI on 8-9 October to exchange information on GOI's CWC implementation and to discuss the Muthanna Bunkers. Particularly, the U.S. DoD Rep highlighted the presentations that will take place on the bunkers: the overview briefing on what we assess to be the current state of the bunkers and bunker contents and general considerations that could be applied to any intrusive bunker survey. The



German Rep was keen on receiving any information that the United States deems applicable to the German offer of assistance. Both countries agreed to exchange readouts of their respective meetings with the GOI, possibly on the margins of the October Executive Council meeting.

#### Iraq: Quad Discussion

¶22. (SBU) Both Burkhardt and Beik commented on GOI,s current effort in The Hague to solicit support for EC membership France, followed by other Quad countries agreed that GOI,s membership is an issue for the Asian Group and not one that should be left to the Conference of States Parties. France added that any lobbying they could do would likely be counterproductive. The UK agreed, adding that the Asian Group should be ultimately responsible.

¶23. (SBU) The UK highlighted the National Authority training that they are co-hosting with the United States in Liverpool for the GOI. Harrison added that it will be focused on industrial inspections. The US HOD informed the Quad of the meetings in Washington next week that will have GOI representatives from across their interagency. He noted the communication challenges that we have witnessed between Baghdad and The Hague.

¶24. (SBU) The US responded to Burkhardt,s question on the South African proposal for a working group on future cases similar to the Iraq recovered munitions scenario by stating that it would proceed cautiously and that the objective of the working group needs to be made clear. The US further noted that the South Africans will continued to push this issue at the OPCW.

¶25. (SBU) In terms of Iraqi assistance, the UK stated they would be willing to provide training. The US stated they were asked by the Director General to provide security for the OPCW delegation,s visit to Iraq but noted they would only provided security if the request came from Iraq.

¶26. (SBU) Discussions regarding the letter the from DG noting past transfers to Iraqi were limited with each participant stating they were still investigating the issue with the exception of the UK, which did not receive a letter.

¶27. (SBU) The U.S. stated they will be advising the Iraqi delegation on assistance when they visit the United States. The US also discussed the needed investigation of the bunkers of Muthana and that a discussion is needed of what needs to be done there. A report on the recovered munitions is going to the Executive Council soon.

#### IRAN

¶28. (SBU) On Iran, UK Rep Rampling stated that recent events in Tehran have affected Iranian actions at OPCW. Although the nuclear and chemical issues should not be mixed, the broader context of what is happening on the nuclear side will likely have some impact at OPCW. French Rep Raharinaivo agreed that we should not mix issues but others may do so. German OPCW PermRep Burkhardt noted that there is likely to be a new Iranian Ambassador in The Hague before the CSP and that the new Deputy is becoming more active over time.

#### DG SELECTION

¶29. (SBU) Discussion centered on process over the next few weeks and whether the EC will be able to make a single choice as agreed during the July EC. Rampling raised the question of Ambassador Dani,s role complicating the process. Mikulak outlined the Chairman,s plans for a straw poll, or possibly two, before the EC, but raised the question of what happens should there still be three candidates at the end of the EC session. Burkhardt noted the importance of confidence in the Chairman and his ability to convince candidates to withdraw. Raharinaivo noted indications that Dani might consider the Deputy DG position in withdrawing from the DG race; however, others noted that decision does not lie with the Council but with the new DG and that Dani is now known for strong managerial skills. Rampling emphasized the likely necessity in the new future of governments approaching the Algerian government to withdraw Dani, but said that countries with candidates would not be able to make that approach. As all

eyes turned to the French, Raharinaivo stated that the French delegation was the best placed to do so.

¶30. (SBU) UK and German delegations exuded confidence in their respective candidates and in private conversations with U.S. and French delegations dismissed suggestions that they work out a deal.

#### BUDGET:

¶31. (SBU) Burkart reported that in the first wrap-up meeting for the budget held the day before, the only apparent stumbling block remains the number of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs). UK Rep Foggo noted the strong defense that the DG had made for his inspections proposal, the same proposal he had made for the 2009 budget and so not one that he considers an increase in inspections, and therefore not requiring discussion in the industry cluster. U.S. Delrep Beik said the budget meetings had an air of detachment from the previous year, with virtually the same budget and same contentious items. Mikulak noted that the Chinese had taken a new tack in his meeting the week before, stating that destruction would need to be completed before an increase in industry inspections. Raharinaivo noted that the increase is only two inspections and thought there was not much to fight over.

#### INDUSTRY ISSUES

¶32. (SBU) All Quad participants expressed frustration over the stalemated negotiations which have been underway for a decade. Mikulak suggested putting the negotiation on hold for a couple of years if a resolution could not be reached by the end of the year (when the facilitator's term will end). Foggo (UK) considers that the Canadian proposal injected new energy into the discussions, that the UK can support the proposal, and that the UK sought the Quad's views on it. Ruthe (DE) and Raharinaivo (FR) consider the Canadian proposal less than perfect. In particular, Pellay (FR) noted that French law would probably have to be amended to implement. (In a side bar conversation, Pellay also commented that the Canadian proposal was illogical.) Mikulak said the Canadian effort, and that while the U.S. is taking a serious look at the Canadian proposal, the U.S. situation is similar to that of France. Furthermore, the proposal has no concentration threshold, which will result in each relevant facility having to track its production levels (unlike all other declaration regimes) to determine whether to declare. Therefore, this proposal is not as simple as a straight concentration threshold. The discussion ended with Foggo (UK) noting that the Italian facilitator had not scheduled any further sessions after next week's industry consultations and won't unless a compromise looks possible.

#### FUTURE OF THE OPCW

¶33. (SBU) At Mikulak's suggestion the Quad agreed it was a good idea to individually approach the Director General in regards to the DG creating and circulating a legacy paper that would detail strategic issues States Parties should consider for the OPCW's future. This paper would assist in initiating discussions among States Parties on the direction of the OPCW. France noted that the turning point for the OPCW's focus to transition from destruction to nonproliferation is nearing and the Quad needed to manage the transition. Mikulak stated that this transition will impact upcoming budgets and there needs to be a mechanism for discussing strategic directions. The UK listed their focus for the 2010 CSP which included: Science and technology (as it relates to the TS), Training and Preparation for Inspections of Alleged Use, and Experience within the TS.

#### NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

¶34. (SBU) The U.S. had added this item to the agenda, Mikulak said, to stress its ongoing importance and encourage the TS and governments to assist States Parties in their implementation efforts. Burkart noted that the new facilitator should be encouraged to draft a decision for the CSP, as it was the last decision that resulted in the recent comprehensive report by the TS to the Council on progress

made by countries working on legislation and establishing procedures. Rampling agreed that the issue needs to be given the prominence it deserves, and that a decision by the Conference that makes permanent the requirement for an annual TS report. Raharinaivo recalled the difficulty in getting a decision on Article VII at last year's CSP but agreed that it is important to work toward that end.

#### Chemical Incapacitants

¶35. (SBU) As a follow-on to discussions, begun at the previous meeting, about how best to address chemical incapacitants within the context of the CWC, the allies focused their attention on the overall threat of such chemicals and those countries that may be pursuing research and development efforts. The United States presented a briefing entitled &Incapacitant Proliferation and Threat Overview,8 which provided key points on the growing interest in fentanyl and a country specific overview. The U.S. briefing (given by Scott Brittain of DIA) concluded that chemical incapacitants are currently not a threat to U.S. or allied forces and are unlikely to be used in traditional battlefield scenarios. Worldwide interest in fentanyl, however, as evidenced by research publications will continue to increase.

¶36. (SBU) German expert Beck, inquired about the increase in publications on incapacitants (i.e., fentanyl), noting that such chemicals have been known for decades. The German and UK delegations further noted the legitimate, medical uses for such chemicals, albeit in smaller quantities. Delegations agreed that the potential military interest in incapacitants in some instances remain a serious issue that information should continue to be monitored.

¶37. (SBU) UK MOD expert Harrison also read a short statement that mirrored many of the U.S. observations and conclusions. Although allies agreed that we should stay clear from trying to define the term incapacitants or attempt to define the scope of the term &law enforcement8, the UK did provide a definition for the purposes of their presentation and highlighted many of the same points in the U.S. presentation and further noted that such chemicals were currently not a threat to UK forces as well.

¶38. (SBU) The French delegation also welcomed the U.S. presentation but admittedly had not looked closely at other countries, interests. Raharinaivo was reluctant to give too much significance to open source publications, which are generally tied to commonly known applications (i.e., pharmaceutical). He further noted the need for the group to continue to coordinate on this issue.

¶39. (SBU) The UK delegation noted inquiries made by their Parliament on the issue of incapacitants. They also pointed to studies by UK academics and the British Medical Association as evidence of interest in the UK.

¶40. (SBU) Allies noted the value of these small group discussions and agreed to continue to work closely together to be prepared to manage this issue in the OPCW. UK expert Harrison offered to prepare a brief paper on potential options for transparency measures for the next close allies meeting in Washington in April 2009.

#### Delegates

¶41. (U) France: Mr. Jacques Raharinaivo, MFA; Mr. Frank Tecourt, MFA; Ms. Marie-Gaelle Robles, MFA; Mrs. Raja Rabia, Deputy Representative, Permanent Representation to the OPCW; Mr. Augustin Baulig, MOD; Mr. Delapschaidieu, MOD.

¶42. (U) Mr. Chris Rampling, FCO; Mr. Steve Crossman, FCO; Mr. James Harrison, MOD; Dr. Jim McGilly, MOD; Dr. Lorna Miller, MOD; Mr. Clive Rowland, MOD; Mr. John Foggo, DECC (NA for the CWC); Mr. Karl Rodrigues, DECC.

¶43. (U) USA: Dr. Robert Mikulak, DOS; Ms. Jennie Gromoll, DOS; Mr. Johnathan Beckett, DOS; Mrs. Janet Beik, Permanent Representation to OPCW; Ms. Katharine Crittender, DOS; Mr. Doug Brown, DOS; Mr. Damon Prather, DOS; Mr. Scott Brittain, Defense Briefer; Mrs. Sarah Rodjom, DOD; Mr. Hugo Guevara, U.S. Embassy Berlin.

¶44. (U) Germany: Ambassador Peter Gottwald, FFO; Mr. Roland Grafe, FFO; Amb Werner Burkart, Permanent Representative to



OPCW; Dr. Holger Ruthe, FFO; Ms. Juliane Thummel, FFO; Dr.  
Volker Beck, FFO; LtC Ewald Helmut Nau, MOD; LtC Nicholas  
Keen, MOD.  
Murphy